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Abstract
States exist in an anarchic international system in which survival is the necessary 
precursor to fulfilling all of their citizens’ other interests. Yet states’ inhabitants – and 
the policymakers they empower – also hold social ideas about other ends that the state 
should value and how it should pursue them: the ‘role’ they expect their state to ‘play’ 
in international politics. Furthermore, such role-performative impulses can motivate 
external behaviours inimical to security-maximization – and thus to the state survival 
necessary for future interest-fulfilment. This article therefore investigates the tensions 
between roleplay and realpolitik in grand strategy. It does so through interrogation 
of four mutual incompatibilities in role-performative and realpolitikal understandings 
of ‘Great Powerness’, a core – but conceptually contested – international-systemic 
ordering unit, thereby demonstrating their necessary logical distinctiveness. The 
argument is illustrated with brief case studies on the United States, China, France, 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan. Identification of such security-imperilling 
role motives thus buttresses neoclassical realist theory; specifically, as an account of 
strategic deviation from the security-maximizing realist baseline. Such conclusions carry 
important implications for both scholarship and statecraft, meanwhile. For once we 
recognize that roleplay and realpolitik are necessarily distinct incentive structures, 
role motives’ advocates can no longer claim that discharging such performative social 
preferences necessarily bolsters survival prospects too.
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In realist international thought, there is no higher imperative than safeguarding state 
survival. State security protects citizens in an anarchic system, and so is the necessary 
precursor to all other goods. Yet as even avowedly ‘structural’ realists – those who privi-
lege relative capability distributions over individual states’ ‘contents’ in explaining inter-
national politics (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979) – recognize, in moving from systemic 
outcomes to individual units’ behaviour, those contents have substantial causal effects 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Waltz, 1967).1 Furthermore, those ‘contents’ – the people 
making a state’s policies and the (s)electorate empowering them – hold social ideas about 
what else the state should value and how it should advance those values in international 
politics: the ‘role’ they want their country to ‘play’ in the world. And sometimes, such 
role motives drive states towards strategic choices that diminish or imperil their own 
security: the very precursor to fulfilment of their other interests.
This article therefore presents a role-derived neoclassical realist account of grand-
strategic ‘error’ (Schweller, 2004: 168).2 Specifically, it demonstrates that roleplay is 
an analytically distinct incentive structure from doing what it takes to survive in an 
anarchic international system (realpolitik)3 – and that those distinct incentives can 
produce strategic deviation from a realist baseline of maximizing state survival pros-
pects. Describing such role-motivated choices as ‘error’ is not a pejorative judgement; 
role-performative pressures can be powerful for good reasons, and such choices are 
therefore eminently defensible. That said, it acquires normative-prescriptive connota-
tions when role-motivated reduction of the state’s material security itself negatively 
affects citizens’ welfare.
Why does such a contribution matter? After all, roleplay and realpolitik may align 
much of the time; discharging particular social-behavioural expectations can improve 
states’ survival prospects under certain mutually reinforcing conditions. Role advo-
cates contend, meanwhile, that the two are actually synonymous: that performing a 
particular normative role in world politics delivers national security.4 Sometimes, 
however, roleplay and realpolitik pull in different directions; the desire to fulfil a set of 
social-behavioural expectations instead diminishes national security and complicates 
long-term survival prospects. The article illustrates this with the following three case-
pairs: the United States/China, the United Kingdom/France and Germany/Japan. For 
scholars, explaining role-performative impulses’ divergence from realpolitikal impera-
tives illuminates both state behaviour and the systemic outcomes that follow. For prac-
titioners, meanwhile, recognition of different behavioural motivations – and the 
tensions, trade-offs and contradictions that role-performative impulses versus realpoli-
tikal imperatives can entail – may improve prospects for making strategic choices that 
adequately fulfil ideational preferences without simultaneously harming their state’s 
relative power, provoking or inviting unnecessary confrontations, and ultimately jeop-
ardizing long-term survival.
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The article achieves this analytical demarcation by scrutinizing the ideal-type of 
‘Great Power’. Such ‘powerness’ is a crucial concept in International Relations (IR), yet 
it carries different meanings in different explanatory approaches. ‘Great Power’ is not the 
only role states want to play, nor is it a role available to all states (Holsti, 1970) – but it 
has particular analytical value to the roleplay versus realpolitik question. In particular, 
role-performative and realpolitikal understandings of ‘Great Power’ set different thresh-
olds on both capability and behaviour; they therefore cannot be treated interchangeably. 
Identifying this dissimilarity shows that roleplay and realpolitik cannot be identical 
either, meanwhile. For if role-performative and realpolitikal understandings of a crucial 
international-systemic ordering unit (‘Great Power’) cannot simultaneously apply ana-
lytically, then the social-ideational desire to perform a particular international role and 
the material-structural imperative to survive cannot simply mean the same thing (i.e. 
continuing to survive cannot simply be treated as part of role, thereby exonerating poli-
cymakers who contend that ideational motivations never imply hard trade-offs with 
national security). So, while role preferences and survival requirements may align, such 
alignment is neither necessary nor assured, permanent nor irreversible.
The article first contrasts social-constructivist and structural-realist understandings of 
‘Great Power’.5 Second, it identifies why the two are logically antonymous. Third, it 
locates role-performative motives as a source of grand-strategic ‘error’ within neoclassi-
cal realism, identifying that whether roleplay and realpolitik are complementary or com-
petitive depends on whether their ‘production’ is mutually reinforcing or otherwise.6 
Fourth, it illustrates its argument using the three case-pairs described earlier. It concludes 
with implications for theory and policy.
Social construction versus material condition: what is a 
‘great power’?
Norms, identities, values, culture, and the role preferences they engender are seen moti-
vating state behaviour throughout international politics (Klotz, 1995; Hopf, 1998: 174–
177).7 A role ‘is the set of expectations attached to the behaviour of an actor in a given 
social situation, like “father” or “customer”’ (McCourt, 2014a: 160, emphasis added). 
Roles are thus derived from identities, but also distinct, as the behavioural expectations 
that follow. Performing or discharging such social-behavioural expectations begets vari-
ous kinds of utility; notably esteem, affirmation, and even ideational security (Mitzen, 
2006). Role is thus related to – but distinct from – status; the latter prizes relative stand-
ing or recognition, while the former is concerned with agential performance (although 
they can be mutually reinforcing in cases where role performance confers prestige).
This article is not an effort to substantively extend role theory, for insightful findings 
already exist.8 Some identify states’ egoistical desire to seek certain roles (Holsti, 1970); 
others note that – since roles require intersubjective recognition of the ‘part’ being 
‘played’ – states only actually achieve them when alter-cast by others (Harnisch, 2011: 
7–8; McCourt, 2014b: 26). Either way, role is ideational – and thus socially constructed.9 
The social-behavioural pressures derived from role expectations may be neither fixed 
nor singular, meanwhile (Thies, 2017 [2010]). States might play multiple roles, with 
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certain ones salient at certain times, due to exogenous circumstances and/or intentional 
mobilization (Holsti, 1970: 277). Multiple roles sometimes co-exist smoothly, but might 
generate domestic contestation (Brummer and Thies, 2015; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; 
Jones, 2017) – and such agreed or contested role motives are themselves products of 
multiple competing pressures.10 More powerful states may also seek certain roles while 
disregarding others (Holsti, 1970), highlighting a relationship between material where-
withal and social standing.
The central contribution of all such approaches, however – and the salient point for 
this article – is that states’ inhabitants can derive utility (esteem, affirmation, cognitive 
comfort/security, domestic/international acclaim, and similar ‘goods’) from fulfilling the 
international-behavioural expectations produced by social ideas of appropriate conduct, 
that is, their ‘role’ in world affairs.11 This admits a potentially infinite array of roles that 
states might derive value from performing. But one particular role stands out for those 
that attempt to provide a preferred order in the system: ‘Great Power’. Under role-per-
formative approaches, a state is such a ‘Power’ if other states identify it as one given the 
ordering role they expect it to perform.
The special role for ‘Great Powers’ as an exceptional category with both the where-
withal – as military powers of the ‘first rank’ – and the responsibility to use force to 
uphold international ‘order’ was advocated by Hedley Bull (1977: 201).12 Such introduc-
tion of a social-behavioural expectation (‘responsibility’ to uphold ‘order’) juxtaposes 
against the simple materialist coding of ‘great powerness’ utilized by structural realists 
– that is, relational weighing of the military and latent-military resources that provide the 
ultima ratio of will-enforcement in an anarchic international system – without associated 
behavioural requirements (Berridge and Young, 1988; Monteiro, 2014: 3; Waltz, 1979: 
162).13 Constructivist international theories, by contrast, embraced and expanded Bull’s 
approach, suggesting that even under international anarchy, social understandings of 
interstate hierarchy, legitimate behaviour, and intersubjective recognition may shape 
international behaviour in ways that qualify the exercise of material power (Clark, 1989, 
2009; Hopf, 1998; Hurd, 1999; Lake, 1996: 174). Capacity to use force is necessary but 
not sufficient to qualify as a great power under such approaches, since the ‘Great Power’ 
role requires the discharge of certain societal responsibilities to uphold international 
order (i.e. fulfilment of social-behavioural expectations).
Developing such approaches, Justin Morris (2011) suggests that even ‘non-polar’ 
powers – his focus is Britain – retain plausible claims to ‘Great Power’ role, because they 
act militarily to uphold international order on a scale greater-than-or-equal-to all bar the 
United States. David McCourt (2014a: 160) correspondingly dubs France and Britain 
‘residual’ Great Powers. Both use military force – alongside diplomatic trappings of 
greatness, such as veto-wielding permanent membership of the UN Security Council – 
abroad in defence of a conception of international order, hence the ‘Great Power’ role. 
Their foreign-policy elites and (to an extent) publics are also cognitively and discur-
sively bound by ‘Great Power’ self-conceptions, despite decline since their relative 
zeniths. However, this role is ‘residual’ – a cognitive legacy of historical position and 
habit (Hopf, 2010) – and relational because it is enabled by particular relationships with 
the system’s greatest power, the United States, and with each other.14 On this reading, the 
likes of Britain and France may already lack the ‘full-spectrum’ military capability to 
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independently enforce regional order (part of Bull’s conception), as well as failing 
Waltz’s polarity test. Such relative weakness would not preclude fulfilment of role-
defined interests, however, because alliances are also part of that role – on this account 
– and they provide the necessary support to order-upholding military activism (McCourt 
2014a: 160).
The flaw in these role-based conceptions of states’ ‘great powerness’ is elucidated by 
two realist insights: that states (as vehicles for their citizens’ security) seek to survive, 
and that relative power – topped by latent or manifested military capability – is their only 
reliable means of doing so, given others’ potential hostility within an anarchic system 
lacking reliable rule-enforcement (Copeland, 2000a; Mearsheimer, 2001: 31–36). 
McCourt, for example, asserts that states’ roles are not the same as their interests, ambi-
tions, values, or capabilities (McCourt, 2014a: 166). Yet he also asserts that interna-
tional-social role produces national interests, rather than the other way around (McCourt, 
2014a: 174); a further-reaching social-constructivist argument. These two positions 
expose a tension. The former recognizes that states can have interests beyond playing a 
particular role. Yet the latter suggests that the role itself creates the interests; thus, that 
states cannot have interests beyond those constructed by a particular role.
The less contentious point – that playing any international-societal role is one of mul-
tiple interests – admits the possibility of a hierarchy of state goals, wherein role remains 
subordinate to other concerns. On this view, the most fundamental interest would remain 
survival as a sovereign entity with control of its own foreign-policy,15 since a state that 
does not survive cannot achieve anything else either (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31; Waltz, 
1979: 91–92). Following a ‘hierarchy of needs’ approach (Maslow, 1943), survival 
necessitates – as associated interests – human-biological security for the population and 
some welfare-essential level of economic prosperity. Of course, threats to such hierar-
chy-topping interests are themselves socially construed – but crucially, all have a mate-
rial base, physically and biologically independent of social role construction.16
Accepting this interest-hierarchy alongside realism’s identification of the potential 
dangers inherent to anarchical international systems would incentivize having not just 
some military capability for role-performance, but sufficient capability – where ‘suffi-
ciency’ is relational, and thus a product of relative power17 – to conduct survival-essen-
tial military missions.18 And attempting to ensure survival independently – as a ‘power’ 
in the realist sense, rather than trusting wholly to allies – may require different national 
capabilities compared to merely discharging a societal role alongside allies.
To be sure, states are freer to indulge preferred social roles when international-sys-
temic pressures are relatively low; they may see fewer security costs weighing against 
the perceived political benefits of enacting ideational preferences when facing few pow-
erful adversaries, as Washington and its allies have done under US unipolarity (Walt, 
2018: 6). Indeed, given that states – especially nuclear-armed or -latent major powers – 
now rarely ‘die’ through external aggression (Fazal, 2007), one obvious rejoinder to 
arguments that roleplay can run contrary to realpolitik is simply that state survival is 
seldom jeopardized anyway. If true, that would mean that states are free (even embold-
ened) to fulfil their role preferences without compromising security.
Such rejoinders are flawed, however. Certainly, states enjoying abundant relative 
power face fewer immediate structural checks on giving rein to ill-thought-through 
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strategic ideas (Porter, 2018). But the reason that both over- and under-confrontational 
strategic postures may go unpunished in the post-1945 international system – mutual 
nuclear threat, and thus deterrence, between major powers (Jervis, 1989) – is the same 
reason that survival is always in some degree of jeopardy. Any role-motivated choice that 
produces even modest additional risk of escalation between states armed with (or capa-
ble of generating) nuclear weapons is thus a threat to national security.19
Of course, states other than great powers also both want to survive and succeed in 
doing so. Shrewd alignment with powerful allies, accommodation of others’ preferences, 
and avoidance of confrontation with potential enemies are all elements of effective, secu-
rity-maximizing national strategy (Geyer, 1986) – especially when doing so allows 
favourable ‘guns/butter’ trade-offs (that is, the provision of superior domestic welfare). 
Over-armament or -assertiveness can also be self-defeating when it provokes counterbal-
ancing (Walt, 1985), as discussed subsequently. In short, survival is multiply realizable 
through strategies informed by relative power plus information on others’ capabilities or 
motives (Glaser, 2010),20 with close alliance-dependence – even at the expense of strate-
gic autonomy – readily explicable through realpolitik.
Nonetheless, wholesale dependence on external balancing carries risks: of abandon-
ment to others’ predations, of coercion by capricious patrons, and of chain-ganging into 
allies’ wars, among others. There are thus good reasons – on realist readings – to want to 
be able to fulfil your military-security requirements independently (Mearsheimer, 2001: 
156–157). Many states simply lack the latent wherewithal to do so, yet that does not 
mean they lack the supreme interest in survival that realists expect.
Fundamentally, then, this is not an argument about ‘greatness’ or its absence. There 
are roles other than ‘Great Power’ (McCourt, 2014b: 19–57), and states other than great 
powers also value survival. It is an argument, rather, about what constitutes state inter-
ests: performing an international-societal role, or safeguarding a hierarchy of materially 
underpinned concerns topped by continued existence. It simply happens that ‘Great 
Power’, as a role that both implies certain behaviours and carries analytical value as a 
particular category of systemic ordering unit, illuminates key fault-lines among the ends 
that states value and the mutual incompatibilities arising between these ends.
Intersubjectivity or objectivity? Role-performative versus 
realpolitikal ‘greatness’
This article recognizes that many states’ strategic choices are – for better or worse – 
heavily influenced by social-behavioural expectations, that is, role conceptions. Yet if 
role is not – as realism demonstrates – the sole source of all state interests, but merely 
one subordinate interest among several, this raises questions over how far roleplay and 
realpolitik can simultaneously co-exist in the same state’s national strategy.
As noted, ‘English School’ variants of social IR theory always maintained that great 
powers must be ‘first rank’ military powers and discharge certain international-social 
responsibilities to sustain international ‘order’. Indeed, enacting such ‘responsibility’ 
clearly requires non-trivial armed capability. Taking this position, the presumed tension 
between roleplay and realpolitik in approaches to ‘great powerness’ might be seen as a 
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straw-man.21 For if the capability to independently defend one’s own security and pros-
perity is part of what it means to be militarily ‘first rank’ then they may also be a part of 
what it means to be a ‘Great Power’. After all, in Bull’s conception, great powers are 
capable of unilaterally exercising local preponderance in their region of concern (Bull, 
1977: 213–219), necessarily excluding those without the military wherewithal to do so 
(Bull, 1977: 203).22
More broadly, for Kalevi Holsti (1970: 262–263), remaining an ‘active independent’ 
– necessitating sovereign self-defence capability – is itself a role. ‘Great Power’ might 
also incorporate many of Holsti’s other posited roles – ‘regional protector’, ‘defender-of-
the-faith’, ‘balancer’ and so forth23 – which similarly privilege military wherewithal. 
Christer Jönnson and Ulf Westerlund (1982) even identify ‘protector-of-own-state’ as a 
role, thereby coding realism’s survival assumption as itself a role behaviour! And in 
identifying the tensions between ‘great power’ (giving the United States scope to act 
alone) and ‘hegemon’ (which rewards multilateral leadership), Bruce Cronin (2001) 
treats both as roles, despite one (unilateral leeway) owing to material wherewithal and 
the other (diplomatic leadership) to social choice. Many varieties of realist thought 
acknowledge behavioural motives beyond mere continued existence, moreover (Waltz, 
1993); possible ‘greedy’ desires beyond survival are necessary for there to be doubt over 
others’ intentions and the resulting security dilemmas, for example, as discussed subse-
quently. Furthermore, role conceptions are often established when and where roleplay 
and realpolitik align; that is, the pressure to survive creates performative expectations, 
thereby delivering role-based esteem and advancing national survival. Witness the 
United States’ Second World War-derived, Cold War-reinforced notion of global indis-
pensability, Britain’s First/Second World War-inspired notion of bastioning Western 
order where others cannot (preferably by mobilizing US commitment but independently 
if necessary), and Germany’s post-1945 notion that European security is best served by 
the demilitarization and strategic subordination of itself.
This attempted incorporation of the realist conception into the role-based conception 
and conflation of roleplay with relative power is theoretically unsatisfactory, however, 
for four key reasons. As such, neither the role-based nor realist conception of ‘great 
power’ is necessarily wrong; either approach may have explanatory utility, depending on 
the question (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011).24 But the two cannot simply be bundled together. 
This carries fundamental implications for policy, since advocates of role-based motives 
(‘we must do this thing because of who we are’) cannot then claim – as per Slaughter 
(2011) – that their choices are simultaneously motivated by realpolitik (‘we must also do 
this thing for our national security’).25 Role-performative behaviours therefore logically 
cannot be synonymous with realist national strategy. This does not preclude social pref-
erences and survival requirements happening to align on some given foreign-policy 
choice. But such happy confluence of aims is not the same as identical underlying 
motives.
First, defining great powers as those that discharge certain responsibilities towards 
international society and possess substantial military capabilities sets a behavioural thresh-
old on ‘great powerness’ that denies international-structural power relations. Rolling inter-
national-social ‘responsibility’ into the definition means that, as Bull admits, the likes of 
Napoleonic France, Imperial or Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union (at times), 
and contemporary Russia or China – that is, all of the potentially ‘revisionist’ states (on an 
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Anglo-American reading) that have launched devastating global war in the modern era, or 
could threaten to today – do not behaviourally ‘count’ as great powers. If such states are not 
great powers, despite their capability to launch catastrophic systemic war, then the defini-
tion is useless. Furthermore, this approach cannot account for international-systemic 
change, because states that seek to overthrow the prevailing balance of power definition-
ally surrender ‘great powerness’. This may be normatively justifiable when assessing idea-
tional motives – launching systemic war may indeed be reprehensible – but it renders the 
approach inoperable as an analytical tool of international-structural politics. For if the 
Second World War was not a ‘great-power war’, because Germany or Japan did not behave 
as ‘great’ powers ‘should’, then what sorts of competition or conflict between powerful 
states can the definition cover?
Second, social-performative understandings of ‘great powerness’ focused on the social 
responsibility (and accompanying means) to use force in support of international order – 
rather than to actually secure the state against any potential aggressor – put too low a bar 
on ‘sufficient’ military capability to meet a realpolitikal understanding of ‘great power-
ness’ because they lack appropriately relational thresholds for relative power. They there-
fore do not necessarily incorporate realism’s survival concerns, undermining the idea that 
roleplay and realpolitik are synonymous. Possessing sufficient force to uphold regional 
order – however defined – may only require defeating, supporting, or stabilizing minor 
powers. Indeed, Bull’s ‘regional preponderance’ criterion depends on the relative strength 
of other regional actors; Australia is better placed to exercise regional preponderance in 
Australasia than Germany or Russia ever have been in Europe, but Australia is clearly not 
the greatest power of the three. Monteiro’s criterion – sufficient capability to avoid certain 
defeat by the system’s most powerful state – is thus integral to any definition focused 
around survival, but not necessarily integral to definitions premised on order-upholding 
role. Roleplay expects that survival will follow as a by-product of being an order-upholder; 
realpolitik anticipates that an ability to uphold international order might follow as a by-
product of being powerful enough to independently defend one’s survival. Either might be 
a useful conceptualization, of course, but they are necessarily non-identical.
Third, the role-performative approach’s assumption that survival is embedded in the 
requirement to be a ‘first-rank’ military power (Bull’s terminology) does not specify the 
relative threshold vis-à-vis other states – of either aggregate power or specific opera-
tional capabilities – required to defend vital state interests. Accordingly, ‘first-rank’ can-
not tell us whether a ‘power’ meets the systemic criterion of defeat-avoidance; it is 
meaningless to discuss states’ ‘capabilities’ without considering what specific missions 
they must be ‘capable’ of. Even at the height of Cold War bipolarity, the United States 
and Soviet Union were still very different sorts of military power, yet each was unam-
biguously ‘great’ (understood as being capable of balancing the other).26 Role-
performance may thus require one military toolkit – enough expeditionary capability to 
contribute to upholding regional order, say – while survival-defence may require quite 
another. Again, the two conceptions of interests are not synonymous and therefore nei-
ther are the external policies motivated by these divergent understandings of interest.
Fourth, and most fundamentally, the argument that ‘great powerness’ is based on both 
the intersubjective recognition of international-social role and on meeting certain mate-
rial-capability prerequisites is self-contradictory. It may be empirically and normatively 
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tempting to assert that both power and behaviour matter, of course, for ‘great powerness’ 
is often empirically or normatively associated with both abundant capabilities and par-
ticular international behaviour. But logically, the two cannot co-exist in the same defini-
tion. For if there is a material-capability threshold to be met, that creates the possibility 
that a state could falsely be perceived by others as a ‘great power’ – despite not meeting 
some required capability threshold – because onlookers were simply confused or misled. 
Performing a social role thus does not in itself constitute ‘great powerness’ in the absence 
of some relational configuration of material capabilities. Conversely, if intersubjective 
recognition of international-social role performance does in fact constitute ‘great power-
ness’, then there cannot also be external material criteria to meet before a state can be 
considered a ‘great power’, provided that its fellows regard it as such.27
The internal incompatibility of the role-recognition and capability-threshold 
approaches can be illustrated by a brief counterfactual. It is probably fair to say that 
nobody still considers the contemporary Netherlands a great power. Yet why is the 
Netherlands not still perceived as a great power? After all, it has a proud military tradi-
tion still characterized by international activism; close relations with ‘residual-power’ 
Britain and France (plus an unambiguous great power, the United States, through NATO); 
and, crucially, it still deploys some power-projection capability to defend a conception of 
international order.28 Furthermore, it was once seen as a great power. The role-based 
explanation to account for this change from ‘major’ to ‘minor’ power is thus circular; the 
Netherlands is no longer seen as a great power – despite these various attributes – simply 
because it is no longer seen as a great power.29 Ultimately, a theory based on whether 
others ascribe great-power status to a state must give way to a theory of relative material 
capabilities when it attempts to account for changes in that status. Either the role consti-
tutes the ‘great powerness’ or the capabilities do; the two cannot be identical.30
As even foundational proponents recognized, therefore, role conceptions do not explain 
everything (Holsti, 1970: 298). Contra Jönnson and Westerlund, ‘defender-of-self’ cannot 
simply be treated as an element of role if social motives are to retain any explanatory 
power. For if mere continued existence is defined as role-performance, then the approach’s 
potential insights – such as why states behave in ways not simply governed by desire for 
continued existence, but by social expectations or prescriptions of appropriate behaviour 
– risk being subsumed into unfalsifiable, post hoc labelling of all possible foreign-policy 
behaviours. As such, roleplay and realpolitik may be complementary, but they are neces-
sarily non-identical. Recognizing that they are separate incentive structures, capable of 
pulling states in different directions, thereby illuminates the internal confliction seen in 
various major powers’ strategic postures, as discussed subsequently.
Roleplay and (neoclassical) realism: accounting for 
strategic ‘error’
The preceding discussion explained roleplay and realpolitik’s logical distinctiveness. 
This section explicates the implications of that distinctiveness for states’ strategic choices 
– and theories thereof – along with the international outcomes that follow.
In developing an explanation of states’ failure to adequately balance against mounting 
external dangers, Randall Schweller (2004) dubbed his neoclassical realism a ‘theory of 
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mistakes’ (p. 168). Such framing captures the insight that superior strategic responses to 
the pressures of an anarchic international system might be impeded by domestic-political 
concerns. Nicholas Kitchen (2010) complements this finding, meanwhile, by identifying 
that domestic strategic ideas are intervening variables between systemic pressures and 
states’ actual grand-strategic responses.31
Incorporating states’ role-performative motives extends such approaches. Like 
‘under-balancing’ (Schweller’s concern),32 generating or intensifying reciprocal animos-
ity through confrontational behaviour (over-balancing), focusing on trivial concerns 
while neglecting more severe dangers (misplaced balancing), and squandering resources 
on costly or unachievable campaigns of political transformation abroad (revisionist 
‘anti-balancing’) are all grand-strategic ‘errors’ that can be motivated by domestic-idea-
tional role conceptions, as subsequent case analysis illustrates.33 Furthermore, because 
international politics is an output of powerful states’ choices, accounting for such ‘errors’ 
does not simply explain occasional strategic failures. Instead, states’ preferences beyond 
mere survival – and the behaviours they yield – can explain aspects of international poli-
tics itself.34 Indeed, as Schweller (1996) identifies, the possibility of greedily motivated 
revisionism is necessary to generate the doubt over others’ benign intent that the security 
dilemma requires,35 while (with Jennifer Mitzen, 2011) unwarranted confidence in oth-
ers’ malevolence can intensify security dilemmas towards actual war-initiation (just as 
unwarranted confidence in their beneficence can leave others’ revisionism unchecked). 
States might even derive ideational utility from antagonism itself (Mitzen, 2006) – or, 
conversely, accept others’ role-justifications as excusing otherwise-antagonistic behav-
iours (Goddard, 2018). Social role-performative preferences can thus sit on either side of 
this explanatory ledger, motivating undue belligerence or inadequate balancing, as the 
cases below elucidate.36
Obviously, if performing a particular international-societal ‘role’ in the world was 
permanently and completely aligned with maximizing national security prospects – as 
certain advocates imply – there would be no tension. Sometimes, moreover, role-perfor-
mance and security-maximization do recommend identical policy choices. But as the 
logical demarcation above demonstrated, roleplay and realpolitik are not permanently 
and completely aligned, so they do not necessarily recommend identical policy choices. 
Accordingly, as the cases below highlight, domestic-ideational performative concerns 
can explain deviation from the realist ‘baseline’ of security-maximization37 – and thus 
explain grand-strategic ‘error’ (that is, under- or over-confrontational strategies vis-à-vis 
that security-optimizing baseline).
The sometimes-complementary-yet-sometimes-conflictual interaction between role-
performance and security-maximization can be depicted diagrammatically. In Figure 1, 
BC represents a state’s budget constraint: the amount of resources available to discharge 
grand strategy. ICo represents the optimal-achievable indifference curve – the combina-
tions of security-provision and role-performance among which the state’s inhabitants are 
equally satisficed, and thus indifferent38 – given such resource constraints. PPFB depicts 
a ‘normal’ concave production possibilities frontier (PPF), meanwhile, in which ‘produc-
ing’ role-performance does have a cost in terms of additional increments of security – but 
producing more of one does not produce an equal-or-greater reduction in the other, 
meaning that the northeast-most (i.e. utility-maximizing) point of the PPF is some 
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adequately balanced combination of the two. The optimal grand strategy (GSo) is then 
the point at which PPFB touches the state’s budget constraint, thereby reaching the high-
est available indifference curve. In practice, moreover, this situation may characterize 
various real-world strategic trade-offs. For example, many states willingly forego some 
military spending to fund development aid, eschewing some modest increment of secu-
rity to achieve gains in esteem-generating humanitarian role without significantly jeop-
ardizing state survival.39
Extending this logic, the PPF’s shape may permit more than simply some acceptable 
trade-off. If roleplay and realpolitik are not only satisfactorily balanced but mutually 
reinforcing (PPFR) – such that performing a role offers security, which enhances role, 
which again reinforces security (etc.) – this will deliver superior security and role out-
puts compared to pursuing either alone. Figure 2 depicts such conditions, wherein the 
location of GSo – PPFR’s intersection with BC – is to the north and east of either axis 
intercept. Normative role advocates who argue that fulfilling particular role-performa-
tive expectations is the same as optimally defending national security consider this situ-
ation typical. And indeed, it may sometimes occur (e.g. if performing a ‘free-world 
leader’ role also maximized US security during the Cold War, or if West Germany’s 
adoption of a demilitarized ‘civilian’ role was indeed necessary to the stabilization of 
post-1945 Europe that ultimately improved German security).
Unfortunately, however, there is no guarantee of a concave PPF. If choices made 
in pursuit of role-fulfilment positively diminish national security – or vice versa 
Figure 1. Roleplay versus realpolitik with concave (balanced) production possibilities.
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– there is instead a convex PPF between competing outputs, as depicted in Figure 3 
(PPFC). Here, there are two distinct interceptions with the state’s budget constraint 
– neither permitting the same mutually satisfactory level of utility (ICo) as in the bal-
anced (Figure 1) or reinforcing (Figure 2) models above – which imply alternative, 
competing grand strategies (role-performative GSr or security-maximizing GSs, 
respectively). If performing an ‘order-enforcing’ military-interventionist role creates 
security-damaging confrontations or performing a demilitarized ‘civilian’ role jeop-
ardizes a security-enhancing alliance – both real-world possibilities identified below 
– these would be instances of convex role-versus-security PPFs in which ideational 
motives have pushed states towards GSr at the expense of GSs (that is, grand-strate-
gic ‘error’). As demonstrated earlier, meanwhile, roleplay and realpolitik are distinct 
incentive structures, so being sufficiently motivated by the former to make it the 
basis for such strategic choices is necessarily not the same as being wholly motivated 
by the latter.
Such role versus realpolitik divergence could be intensified by power shifts, moreo-
ver. Expansive role conceptions may preclude the prudent retrenchment of power-squan-
dering peripheral commitments incentivized by relative decline (MacDonald and Parent, 
2011). Expanding role-demands might similarly induce imprudent bellicosity in rising 
powers, provoking otherwise-avoidable containment (Edelstein, 2017; Shifrinson, 
2018). Conversely, of course, anti-confrontational role motives could impede adequate 
Figure 2. Roleplay versus realpolitik with concave (reinforcing) production possibilities.
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internal balancing by wealthy-yet-underarmed powers, producing opposite varieties of 
grand-strategic error. Examples of all three appear below.
‘Error’ in action: roleplay versus realpolitik in 
contemporary powers’ strategy
The previous sections explained why roleplay and realpolitik are logically distinct incen-
tive structures motivating states’ strategic choices and what that means for the trade-offs 
they face. This section illustrates how those imperatives can conflict in practice.
Comprehensive empirical testing lies beyond the scope of an article focused on 
theoretical specification of competing logics. Nonetheless, the applicability of role-
play as an alternative motivation that pushes states into grand-strategic ‘error’ can be 
elucidated through examples. Three pairs of powers are considered here to highlight 
how – in different ways – each deviates from the realpolitikal baseline and jeopardizes 
its security by following role-performative social-ideational motivations (that is, each 
manifests at least some behaviours consistent with GSr in Figure 3 above). The pairs 
are grouped into categories, which themselves represent heuristic ideal-types. A single 
article cannot construct original foreign-policy histories for six disparate countries, 
naturally, but it can identify performative concerns influencing strategic choices with 
security consequences.
Figure 3. Roleplay versus realpolitik with convex production possibilities.
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The (unambiguous) great powers: China and the United States
The post-Cold War US has enjoyed unprecedented relative power (Brooks and Wohlforth, 
2008). China, meanwhile, has experienced sufficient developmental convergence since 
the Cold War – combined with its massive population – to render it capable of balancing 
US power and asserting its own preferences in a strategically vital region (Tunsjø, 2018). 
In short, while China is still not an American ‘equal’ in terms of net projectable power 
resources (Beckley, 2018), both are now unambiguous great powers on both role-per-
formative and realpolitikal understandings. As noted earlier, moreover, the greater a 
state’s relative power, the more it can indulge other preferences before its security 
becomes meaningfully threatened (Walt, 2018). Accordingly, such ‘unambiguous’ great 
powers pose a stern test for the argument that role-motivated behaviours can conflict 
with survival imperatives. Nonetheless, both the United States and China can be observed 
pursuing ideational performances that jeopardize their net security.
In 1996, Clinton Administration aides coined the term ‘indispensable nation’ to 
describe America’s post-Cold War world role, thereby justifying not only coercive diplo-
macy and military intervention to enforce US-preferred international order, but also 
ambitious claims of unique American prescience (Zenko, 2014). During the Cold War, 
meanwhile, there may indeed have been a benign confluence between the United States’ 
performative role as leader of the Western bloc and its national security, insofar as the 
United States’ self-protection required assembling capable allies, supporting a mutually 
enriching commercial zone, and preventing the USSR establishing hegemony over major 
Eurasian industrial centres (Mearsheimer, 2001: 256–257).
Since the Cold War’s end, however, this belief in ‘indispensable’ role and associated 
commitment to extending US primacy beyond the Western bloc to establish a global 
hegemonic order has squandered American power and the security that it offers (Porter, 
2018). Of course, under-balancing brings its own perils, while abandonment of useful 
allies to ascendant adversaries’ predation can be doubly self-defeating (Brooks et al., 
2012–2013), so the US choice to extend and consolidate alliance networks in East Asia 
as China rises (for example) is explicable through security-seeking. If it could be 
achieved, moreover, permanent global hegemony would guarantee security (Mearsheimer, 
2001: 40–41), since no other state could ever challenge the hegemon (the system would 
effectively cease to be anarchic). But since no unipolar moment is assuredly timeless – 
and especially when faced by the most economically potent rising peer-competitor since 
its own great-power emergence (Layne, 2012) – realpolitik prescribes prudent husbandry 
of national capabilities, avoidance of gainless escalation, and retrenchment of commit-
ments peripheral to the great-power balance (MacDonald and Parent, 2011). Instead, the 
United States has spent the last two decades wasting lives, treasure, and materiel on 
blowback-provoking, escalation-risking military efforts to police strategically peripheral 
regions – undermining domestic cohesion and thus strategic effectiveness in the process 
(Blagden and Porter, 2021) – motivated by notions of its indispensable ordering role. In 
short, despite its still-unmatched wherewithal, the United States is observably conflicted 
between realpolitikal imperatives to concentrate its power on balancing an ascendant 
peer-competitor (e.g. Silove, 2016) and role-performative impulses to disperse its power 
in service of a particular world-ordering imagined self (e.g. Dueck, 2006; Porter, 2020).
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China, meanwhile, is not an established power attempting to maintain a dominant 
position, but rather a rising power seeking to better secure and advance its interests as its 
capabilities grow. Accordingly, it knows that the passage of time improves its relative 
position (Copeland, 2000b) and that it may minimize others’ balancing reaction, facilitat-
ing continued rise, by eschewing manifestations of revisionist hostility (Edelstein, 2017; 
Shifrinson, 2018). In the United States, it also faces a potential adversary with enduring 
advantages and wherewithal to retard its ascent (Beckley, 2018). Accordingly, Beijing 
faces compelling realpolitikal reasons to (a) eschew unnecessary predations that push 
others into joining with the United States and (b) focus its still-scarce military resources 
on denying US forces access to its interior and littoral.
Are such behaviours observed? In fact, China is devoting non-trivial proportions of its 
still-not-US-matching military expenditures to capabilities suited for extra-regional 
power-projection – notably aircraft carriers – motivated largely by the ideational pursuit 
of standing (Ross, 2009). Furthermore, from its border with India to its influence in the 
Koreas and its claims in the South China Sea, Beijing is now embracing confrontations 
that incentivize balancing by other regional powers – both internal (build-ups of inde-
pendent capabilities) and external (closer alignment with the United States) – explicitly 
citing expanding national interests and desire for a lead role in reshaping the hitherto-
US-led international order (Jiangtao, 2019), consistent with expansive conceptions of 
‘great-power’ identity (Shin, 2018).40 In short, while China clearly does grasp the realpo-
litikal imperative to focus on defending its core territory or littoral (Fravel, 2019) and 
faces compelling balance-of-power incentives to eschew confrontation (Shifrinson, 
2020), the ideational performance of newfound ‘greatness’ (i.e. roleplay) also motivates 
more assertive behaviours (Liu, 2020).
The ‘residual’ great powers? France and the United Kingdom
The United States and China are crucial cases: any study of contemporary great-power 
behaviour that aspires to generalizable utility must cover the system’s two most powerful 
countries. But they are also cases of finite analytical value. Both possess vast concentra-
tions of power-enabling resources and elevated international-societal roles, thereby 
obscuring the distinction between role-performative or realpolitikal understandings of 
‘great powerness’ and their separate incentive structures, as brought into stark relief by 
the contemplation of powers whose ‘greatness’ or otherwise is contestable. This sub-
section therefore analyses France and Britain, as particular exemplars of ‘residual’ great 
powers afflicted by the competing logics (McCourt, 2014a).41
France has the most independently capable armed forces in Western Europe on several 
metrics. Unlike reunified post-1990 Germany – the only European economy larger than 
France and the United Kingdom – it has the ultimate backstop of independent national 
survival, a submarine-based (and thus secure second-strike) nuclear deterrent. Its forces’ 
command-and-control (C2) configuration and doctrine also displays an operational inde-
pendence from allies that their post-1945 German counterparts never regained (albeit with 
increasing US alignment in the post-Cold War era). Unlike the United Kingdom, mean-
while – a state of similar capability and orientation – France has eschewed cost-saving 
reliance on US enablers; for example, by developing its own submarine-launched ballistic 
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missiles to support a logistically independent nuclear deterrent and its own satellite-recon-
naissance capability. Its forces are also larger than UK counterparts, albeit not as well 
equipped in certain areas (Blagden, 2015: 343). In short, while its post-1945 relative 
wherewithal never recovered to pre-1939 levels, France has striven to retain a ‘great-
power’ strategic posture in a realpolitikal sense (as well as a merely role-performative 
one). Nonetheless – like Britain – ‘residual-power’ France’s material base for resourcing 
great-power strategy is stretched by diminished relative economic position and ‘guns-
versus-butter’ tensions (i.e. the funding of domestic goods and services). Moreover, as a 
second-tier member of US-dominated alliance networks, France – like the UK, German, 
and Japanese cases below – has not been the sole provider of its own security since 1945, 
further reducing incentives to fund foreign and defence policy at the expense of domestic 
welfare (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Yet despite this, French ideational commitment to 
performing an ‘order-upholding’ world role has remained intact (Hill, 2016), manifesting 
itself as resource-intensive military interventionism.42
How, then, do roleplay and realpolitik manifest themselves as tension within ‘resid-
ual-power’ France’s grand strategy? Naval posture provides an exemplar. Since the 
decommissioning of FS Clemenceau in 1997, the Marine Nationale has operated only a 
single aircraft carrier (Clemenceau’s sister ship, Foch, was decommissioned in 2000, 
shortly before the maiden deployment of the current carrier, Charles de Gaulle). A single 
hull is adequate for role-performance (Blagden, 2019b: 482–483); it allows France to 
remain the ‘sort’ of country that operates aircraft carriers – a marker of status, as observed 
in the Chinese context (Ross, 2009) – and to fulfil the performative role of dispatching 
such a platform to lead order-enforcing military missions within or beyond the Euro-
Atlantic region. For security-essential missions, however, a single carrier is a net liability 
(Blagden, 2019b: 483); an adversary could simply time hostile action to coincide with 
the ship’s maintenance-, refit-, training-, or defect-induced unavailability. Given the 
opportunity-costs, equivalent resources would thus be better allocated to alternative mili-
tary assets providing full-time availability.43 Fleet balance is therefore a notable instance 
where realpolitikal imperatives are countered by role-performative motives in French 
strategy.
What of Britain, the other Western European ‘residual’ power that – like France – pos-
sesses a submarine-based nuclear arsenal, significant force-projection capabilities, and 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council? Many of the impulses and pressures 
are the same (Hill, 2016).44 The UK has poured military, economic, and human resources 
into several professedly ‘order-enforcing’ expeditionary campaigns so far this century, 
and is now running significant escalatory risks vis-à-vis China to ‘uphold order’ in East 
Asia (Blagden, 2019a: 217). More than France, Britain has embraced dependence on the 
United States to sustain such activism on the cheap (it concedes that it ‘continues to look 
to (America) to shape global stability’) – but like France, it maintains the ultimate hedge 
against US abandonment, an operationally independent nuclear deterrent, while pledging 
to retain the ‘ability to undertake war-fighting independently’ (HM Government, 2015: 
51). And like France, the interaction of role-performative and realpolitikal pressures 
under tight fiscal constraints pulls UK strategy in conflicted directions.
While such tensions have already been interrogated elsewhere (Blagden, 2019b), a 
brief example is illuminating. Unlike France, Britain has concluded that a minimum of 
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two aircraft carriers is required if seeking the assured availability required to fulfil secu-
rity-essential – as opposed to merely role-performative – missions. Indeed, such full-
time availability is the explicit UK rationale for bearing the opportunity-costs of its 
second hull (Blagden, 2019b: 482–483). But also unlike France, with its logistically 
independent and robustly defended atomic arsenal, UK nuclear posture betrays elements 
of role-performative ‘tokenism’ (Blagden, 2019b: 480–482). Notably, between 2010 and 
2020, Britain operated no maritime patrol aircraft with which to protect its nuclear-armed 
submarines, relying instead on allies – particularly the United States – to provide such 
coverage. Accordingly, even while spending on the ultimate supposed hedge against 
alliance-abandonment – operationally independent nuclear deterrence – Britain also 
relied on such allies to protect that deterrent itself.
The ‘civilian’ (great?) powers: Germany and Japan
Despite lacking the means and will to function as systemic poles, Britain and France 
nevertheless strive after residual ‘great powerness’ on two axes: independent ability to 
defend their own existence, manifested most obviously in their nuclear arsenals, and 
performative role, manifested as their willingness or capacity to project military power 
in defence of particular conceptions of international order. As noted, moreover, those two 
axes can stand in tension, for the impulse to fulfil the latter within austere resource con-
straints jeopardizes the former. But there are other comparably positioned states – eco-
nomically developed and technologically advanced, with substantial net power resources 
– that manifest quite different strategic postures to the Anglo-French model. Specifically, 
Germany and Japan have pursued strategic postures of both conscious US alliance-sub-
ordination – without the hedge provided by, say, independent nuclear arsenals – and 
avoidance of militarily-interventionist ‘order-imposing’ roles under the shadow of their 
militarist-belligerent pasts.45
Although both states have significant latent-potential to act as great(er) powers, both 
have pursued security through close alignment with – and subordination to – a hegem-
onic pole incentivized to protect them by its own primacist preferences and structural 
position, thereby enabling their domestically favourable ‘guns/butter’ trade-offs. As 
noted earlier, survival is multiply realizable. However, this has not been a disavowal of 
power altogether; both have pursued – and obtained – international ‘civilian’ roles 
(Maull, 1990) of persuasive influence (backed by economic wherewithal and the induce-
ments that it provides).46 Such a role meets aspects of an international-societal ‘great-
power’ definition when it extends to forms of regional-hegemonic ordering – consider 
Germany’s centrality to the EU/Eurozone – albeit not others (specifically, militarily-
activist order-enforcement). Even for these conscious pursuers of ‘civilian’ role, moreo-
ver, the survival imperatives of an anarchic system continue to exert pressure towards 
strategic ‘normalization’ as major military powers.47 Nonetheless, just as performative 
conceptions lead the great and ‘residually-great’ powers discussed earlier into security-
diminishing over-activism, so too ideational attachment to ‘civilian’ role can lead states 
towards security-imperilling under-activism – an opposite (but potentially no-less-dam-
aging) variety of grand-strategic ‘error’.
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No twentieth-century great power has undergone more comprehensive demilitarization 
than Germany. Occupied and partitioned after defeat in 1945, even reunified and ‘nor-
malized’ post-1990 Germany has continued to forego military connotations of ‘great 
powerness’ – such as nuclear weapons, unilateral doctrine, or long-range power-projec-
tion assets (e.g. aircraft carriers, amphibious-assault ships, heavy-lift aircraft, etc) – 
reflecting embedded social mores (Berger, 1998; Maliki, 2006). Moreover, while the 
German armed forces are modern and sizable by Euro-NATO standards – and have been 
used abroad on various multilateral ‘stabilization’ missions since the Cold War’s end 
(Maull, 2010; Noetzel and Schreer, 2008), ‘re-normalizing’ military force as a policy 
lever compared to post-1945 West Germany’s non-interventionism – they remain small 
and under-developed vis-à-vis Germany’s economic wherewithal. Contemporary 
Germany thereby combines massive industrial and financial wherewithal, as the EU’s 
principal manufacturer, exporter, and monetary-fiscal backstop – alongside the regional-
hegemonic politico-economic role that this brings (Bulmer, 2014) – with military subor-
dination as a NATO (and thus US) protectorate. It is therefore both a ‘power’ and yet 
‘civilian’ in its operationalization of power (Maull, 1990, 2018; Tewes, 1997).
How might such role preferences conflict with security imperatives? After all, German 
under-militarization is a relatively novel concern. Nonetheless, Germany’s low post-
1990 proportional defence spending (Depetris, 2019), force readiness, and deployability 
levels (Clark, 2019; Kluth, 2020) impose two costs on NATO. It leaves external hostility 
under-checked by the principal Continental European member-state with the where-
withal to do something about it.48 And as a corollary, it places overweening demand for 
European security on US taxpayers who understandably resent subsidizing the econo-
mies and public services of major states that do little to defend their own locale (Bennhold, 
2019), thereby jeopardizing the Alliance’s future and thus the whole regional security 
system from which Germany benefits. In short, contemporary Germany provides a pre-
sent-day case of role-motivated ‘under-balancing’, as per earlier theoretical discussion 
(Schweller, 2004).
What of Japan, the other ‘civilian’ power identified by Maull (1990) at the post-Cold 
War era’s dawn? Unlike Germany, Japanese policy elites do not comprehensively reject 
the pre-1945 regime’s every symbol.49 And unlike Germany, contemporary Japan’s mili-
tary forces have already reacquired significant power-projection capabilities.50 
Nonetheless – like Germany – Japan has continued to embrace US alliance-subordina-
tion and eschew independent great-power military posture, including avoidance of 
nuclear weapons, offensive operations, and unilateral doctrinal concepts under a continu-
ing post-1945 constitutional renunciation of belligerency with a domestic-ideational 
base (Berger, 1998).51 Accordingly, while Japan already acts as a ‘power’ in regional 
affairs through its economic or diplomatic heft (Hagström, 2009) – and has taken major 
steps towards military ‘normalization’ (Hughes, 2006) that could stretch further if Tokyo 
felt sufficient pressure – it remains broadly ‘civilian’ in its exercise of regional 
influence.
Do such ideationally motivated role conceptions produce tensions with realpolitik in 
the Japanese case? After all, as noted, Japan has more potent conventional forces than 
Germany, despite its constitutional restrictions, along with the latent capacity to nuclear-
ize quickly (Fitzpatrick, 2016). Nonetheless, the domestic-ideational prohibition on 
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offensive operations has significant defensive implications. Specifically, if Japan found 
itself facing a conflict with its most powerful potential adversary, China, the only way to 
protect its own defensive assets – warships, airfields, C2 nodes and so on – along with 
valued civilian centres might be to target the weapons or forces that could be used against 
them.52 Yet as rivals’ capabilities improve, such targeting increasingly requires long-
range standoff weaponry – the sorts of forces that Japan’s prohibition of ‘offensive’ 
weaponry currently precludes (Reynolds and Calonzo, 2019).53
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that roleplay and realpolitik are neither permanently nor 
benignly aligned. Continuing to perform some ideational role may be a reason that states 
want to survive, of course, alongside prerequisite concerns such as the physical wellbeing 
of the population. Having some sense of national purpose may also facilitate coherent 
national strategy formation, to state survival prospects’ ultimate betterment. Nonetheless, 
roleplay and realpolitik remain analytically distinct, logically separate incentive struc-
tures. States are certainly influenced by both, but – far from natural alignment, whereby 
survival imperatives are a mere component of social role-performance – any ideationally 
underpinned role conception that goes beyond the state simply giving itself the best 
chance of continued existence necessarily points away from the security-maximizing 
position. Consequently, roleplay and realpolitik – far from the natural bedfellows depicted 
by ideological advocates of ‘values-based’ grand strategy – often pull against each other, 
leading policy in confused, conflicted, and sometimes self-defeating directions. Accounting 
for role-performative impulses is thus an important component of explaining state behav-
iour that extends neoclassical realist theories of grand-strategic ‘error’, understood as 
deviation from a security-maximizing realist baseline. The security-maximizing strategy 
may not always be obvious or unambiguous, of course – so this ‘realist baseline’ may not 
be straightforward to operationalize in practice – but, crucially, it is not simply synony-
mous with fulfilling social preferences.
Interrogating the differences between role-performative and realpolitikal conceptions 
of ‘great powerness’ elucidates this logical distinction – especially with policymakers 
around the world now proclaiming a new era of ‘great power competition’ (Blagden, 
2019a), illustrating such concerns’ enduring salience (both rhetorical and substantive). 
While such conceptual interrogation can appear as mere scholastic hair-splitting, its 
value here is to clarify that roleplay and realpolitik are non-identical, with implications 
beyond the definitions themselves. Specifically, whereas role-based conceptions of 
‘powerness’ incentivize some socially expected international performance, realpolitikal 
criteria prioritize the independent means to defend one’s own interest-hierarchy. These 
two conceptions cannot be readily elided in theory, moreover, for ‘great powerness’ can-
not simultaneously be based on intersubjective social role recognition and an objective 
threshold of national capabilities. Of course, in practice, both material and ideational 
concerns shape states’ foreign or defence policies, as both constructivist and realist per-
spectives recognize, and as case studies of six contemporary ‘powers’ – of varying levels 
and understandings of ‘greatness’ – demonstrated. Nonetheless, if policymakers and 
scholars alike can be more explicit about the different kinds of pressures that motivate 
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state behaviour – and trade-offs that may exist between such motivations – they will be 
better placed to make strategic choices that serve their various ideational preferences 
without doing major harm to long-term national security in the process.
Such conclusions point to several potentially fruitful avenues of future research. First, 
since roles often arise through benign coincidence with security optimization – yet 
remain habitual even as strategic circumstances shift, producing role-performative and 
realpolitikal divergence – what ‘shocks’ are necessary and/or sufficient to produce rea-
lignment? Second, since states clearly do tolerate costs – including expenditure of 
national power, which safeguards their security – to fulfil preferred roles, what are the 
components and weightings of their particular utility functions in this area? Third, what 
other role-versus-security conflicted national contexts may benefit from the approach’s 
application, beyond states concerned with ‘powerness’ (great/otherwise)? Finally, as 
Figures 1 to 3 illustrated, whether roleplay or realpolitik are competitive or complemen-
tary ultimately depends on PPF curvature (that is, whether ‘producing’ role-performance 
reinforces or undermines security, and vice versa). Yet such PPFs are not wholly exoge-
nous; they are shaped by states’ own choices. Accordingly, how can states select ends to 
ensure concave PPFs (that is, pursue security-optimal policies consistent with social 
preferences and fashion role-performative ambitions that do not undermine net secu-
rity)? Satisfactorily answering this last question will determine the wisdom or otherwise 
of many countries’ grand-strategic choices as the unipolar moment wanes.
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Notes
 1. See Blagden (2018: 200–202). Accordingly, structural realists’ lobbying for superior foreign-
policy choices does not – as Oren (2009) suggests – contradict their own theory.
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 2. For discussion of what ‘grand strategy’ actually is, see Silove (2018). This article employs a 
derivative of Posen’s (1984: 13) parsimonious framing, namely that it is a state’s notion(s) of 
how to maximize utility for itself in an anarchic international system.
 3. ‘Roleplay’ is flippant, of course, since such pressures are hardly inconsequential. Realpolitik 
and realism are non-identical, meanwhile; realpolitik, as a tradition of strategic thought, does 
not ‘belong’ to any one theoretical paradigm (Goddard and Nexon, 2016). That said, realpo-
litik is here treated as the strategic prescriptions that follow (non-exclusively) from certain 
realist assumptions about world politics (Bew, 2016: 5–7, 13–14).
 4. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2011), for example – a prominent advocate of power-sapping, 
blowback-provoking Western military activism – argues explicitly that ‘values-based’ (i.e. 
ideationally motivated) and ‘interest-based’ (i.e. self-preserving) US strategy should be 
understood as the same thing. See similarly Haass (2017); in another national context, Seely 
and Rogers (2019).
 5. This and the subsequent section develop arguments already introduced in a country-specific 
context (Blagden, 2019b: 473–479).
 6. This piece thus answers the call to elaborate structurally-based realisms’ micro-foundations 
(Freyberg-Inan et al., 2009).
 7. Even prominent contemporary users of structural realism expound this position (Wohlforth 
et al., 2018).
 8. For foundational contributions, see Holsti (1970), Jönnson and Westerlund (1982), Walker 
(1987). For contemporary developments, see for example, Thies (2017 [2010]), Harnisch 
(2011), Thies and Breuning (2012), Cantir and Kaarbo (2012), and Brummer and Thies 
(2015).
 9. Theorizing the international system as itself a social construction, see Wendt (1999). For 
explicit linkage of role-based foreign-policy analysis to constructivist theory, see Thies and 
Breuning (2012), McCourt (2014b: 1).
10. Competing ideologies, sectoral or class interests, (sub-)national culture(s), partisan or fac-
tional contestation or coalitions, regime-type and -composition, historical position or griev-
ance, and civil-military or bureaucratic dynamics all contribute to societal expectations of 
international role – as do material security and prosperity pressures, the very imperatives that 
are sometimes violated by role-performative impulses. Since theorizing all such variables lies 
beyond a single article’s scope, however, the salient point here is that they sum to produce 
role-performative motives.
11. Although such social ideas may have a connection to material security and/or prosperity 
imperatives, as discussed subsequently.
12. Although Holsti’s (1970) article preceded Bull’s (1977) book, Bull does not cite Holsti, seem-
ingly drawing related inferences through different channels.
13. Under this approach, only the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) have qualified as systemic ‘poles’ – states capable of independently balancing against 
the other most powerful state(s) in the system – since 1945, and only the former since 1990 
(although China is arguably now ascending to polarity, as discussed subsequently). At most, 
structural realists saw major post-Cold War European or Asian states as latent-potential great 
powers (Mearsheimer, 2001: 392). Assessing that only poles are true great powers means 
that the likes of Britain or France – that is, the socially performative ‘powers’ discussed sub-
sequently – are obviously not among them. That said, refined structural understandings (e.g. 
Monteiro, 2014: 42–48) identify ‘major’ powers as non-polar powers that nevertheless pos-
sess sufficient capacity to have significant prospects for defending their own survival-essential 
local interests – with non-trivial systemic consequences – even against polar ‘great’ powers 
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(identified by their capability to threaten others’ interests throughout the system). Further 
understandings recognize that the global system comprises regional sub-systems, each con-
taining ‘powers’ of varying capability, the relational position of which differs between their 
intra- and extra-regional interactions (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Of course, such great-versus-
major, global-versus-regional demarcations – while reintroducing recognition of particular 
structural significance for consequential-but-non-polar states, such as China, Russia, India, 
France, and the United Kingdom under post-1990 US unipolarity – themselves admit further 
complexity or ambiguity, not least because change and/or uncertainty in relative power may 
be the very dynamic incentivizing states towards competition. To bypass such intractable 
debates, therefore, this article adopts a contextual-systemic approach to structural ‘power-
ness’, that is, states pursue or achieve such structural position – irrespective of adjectival 
qualifier – when they have non-trivial prospects of defending their welfare-essential interests 
against their most potent possible adversary in the context salient to them.
14. That is, the ‘similarly-residual’ other attempts to do the same, creating opportunities for bur-
den-sharing and mutual recognition.
15. Or at least a willing part of such an entity, since polities can choose to merge with another pol-
ity, state, or bloc(s) to further their population’s welfare (indeed, this explains contemporary 
nation-states’ very formation).
16. Human assessments of interest – and danger thereto – are perceptual, and thus ultimately 
ideational. But those ideas cannot exist independently of human bodies’ material base. 
Accordingly, threats may indeed be socially construed – but physical survival is the necessary 
precursor to such construal, hence its ceteris paribus motivational primacy (and states are 
the most potent organizational collectives yet created for population protection, hence why 
state survival ceteris paribus supports population survival). On power-sensitive behaviour’s 
evolutionary-survivalist basis, see Thayer (2000); on material scarcity’s centrality in neces-
sitating competitive inter-communal politics, see Hamilton and Rathbun (2013).
17. Accordingly, Geoff Berridge and John Young (1988) explicitly reject arguments that ‘great 
powerness’ has an intersubjective or performative base, linking it rather to reputation for suf-
ficient latent or manifested power to balance any other state.
18. On the necessity of sufficient capability to accomplish associated military missions in achiev-
ing national objectives, see Glaser (2010: 40–41). Of course, such essentialness is perceptual, 
albeit with a material base underpinning those perceptions.
19. On how lower-level conventional confrontation could lead to survival-jeopardizing nuclear 
catastrophe, see Posen (1991).
20. Friend and/or enemy identities may condition motives, although realists question such rela-
tionships’ reliability (Copeland, 2000a; Blagden, 2018).
21. Contemporary debates display such conflation, with polarity – understood by structural realists 
as an objective capability distribution – used discursively to invoke subjective status recogni-
tion (Zala, 2017). On the resultant confusion in states’ strategy debates, see Blagden (2019a).
22. This may imply that ‘residual Great Power’ is a nonsensical category, suggesting a ‘first-rank’ 
military power that is simultaneously not first-rank.
23. Such ‘laundry-listing’, à la Holsti, is a fundamental weakness of early role theory, since it per-
mits unfalsifiable, post hoc rationalization of all possible foreign-policy behaviours through 
idiosyncratic nomenclature (as contemporary role theorists themselves contend; McCourt, 
2014b: 26). This article therefore merely reports such arguments, rather than endorsing 
them. For its advocates, however, the ‘Great Power’ role is different; as a set of social-per-
formative expectations linked to specific international ordering functions, it permits binary 
classification.
24. That is, the former may account for states’ social behaviours while the latter accounts for their 
structural imperatives. On explanatory-theory-as-utilitarian-heuristic, see Humphreys (2011).
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25. Where ‘who we are’ functions as shorthand for identity, values, norms, status, and preferences, 
which produce social role-performative expectations.
26. Soviet naval strategy differed fundamentally from North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) strategy, for example, pursuing mere sea denial – rather than assured control or 
projection – in the North Atlantic (Blagden et al., 2011: 194). Indeed, the requirement to be a 
‘first-rank’ military power to qualify as ‘great’ might suggest that international systems could 
only ever be unipolar (since only one player can be ‘first’) – yet this would obviously be both 
analytically unhelpful and substantively absurd.
27. Although material capabilities may facilitate such recognition’s attainment, obviously.
28. It possesses amphibious-assault ships and a competent marine corps, for example. Substantial 
Dutch contingents were also active in the post-9/11 Iraq/Afghan campaigns.
29. The Netherlands lost certain wars, obviously, but so did France. The difference was that 
France had the underlying resources to return to military major powerness; the Netherlands 
did not.
30. This does not preclude other dimensions to national prowess that the Netherlands has in 
abundance – culture, art, history, values, institutions, commerce, natural and built landscape, 
exemplary public servants, and so on – so the argument is not pejorative. The concern here, 
rather, is simply relative power in the system.
31. Gideon Rose (1998) introduced realism’s ‘neoclassical’ qualifier, contending that such 
approaches productively combine anarchic systems’ structural constraints (à la neoreal-
ism) with pre-neorealist ‘classical’ realism’s domestic-political motivations, thereby making 
a ‘new-classical’ realism. Extending this, Brian Rathbun (2008) identifies that neorealism 
requires the possibility of domestically sourced policy variation to explain the behaviours 
(such as conflict-initiation) endemic in anarchic international systems – but equally, that such 
anarchic structure still then accounts for the prevalence of conflict. Of course, neoclassical 
realism has recently faced charges of incorporating domestic-level factors that violate real-
ist assumptions (Narizny, 2017) – yet others counter that only by incorporating state-level 
variance can we achieve satisfactory realist explanations (Fiammenghi et al., 2018; see also 
Sterling-Folker, 1997).
32. Note that Lobell (2018) questions whether an oft-cited instance of ‘under-balancing’ invoked 
by Schweller – late 1930s Britain – actually did represent balancing failure, or rather whether 
London was simply focused (prudently) on balancing German and Italian power’s most 
threatening components. Adjudicating historical cases is beyond the needs of this article, 
however; key is simply that under-balancing is possible in principle.
33. As noted, this is not normative-pejorative judgement on such preferences’ moral worth(/other-
wise), which might be considerable; ‘error’ is simply vis-à-vis the structural-realist ‘baseline’ 
(Mearsheimer, 2009: 242–244) of maximizing survival prospects. On the value of theorizing 
non-security motives in explaining divergence from security imperatives, see Glaser (2003: 
408).
34. Recent neoclassical realist innovations highlight how domestic ideas provide not only a 
“transmission belt” for systemic pressures, but also how powerful states’ choices themselves 
shape the system (Ripsman et al., 2016).
35. See also Glaser (2010) for developed discussion.
36. Explicitly linking state socialization to behavioural variation in structural–realist explana-
tions, see Thies (2010).
37. Foundational realist works recognize that – though states face ‘rational’ imperatives to secu-
rity-maximize (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31) – other motives can pull them in divergent directions 
(Morgenthau, 1973: 7). Indeed, Waltz (1979: 92, 118) explicitly rejected a security-maximiz-
ing rationality assumption, given other goals that states manifestly can and do pursue – some-
times to survival prospects’ detriment – arguing instead simply that imprudent states will be 
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competed out of existence (his theory arguably thus descends from positive-explanatory to 
normative-prescriptive, since it is then a theory not of how states do behave but of how they 
should behave: Mearsheimer, 2009). Role-performative impulses fit among these non-secu-
rity motives. Even rationality-assuming structural realists recognize, meanwhile, that states 
have a goal-hierarchy topped by survival while admitting other interests (e.g. Mearsheimer, 
2001: 46–48). Yet because such parsimonious structural theories do not explain situations in 
which those other interests themselves motivate security-jeopardization, such theorists are 
left lamenting their states’ insufficiently ‘realist’ behaviour, as in Mearsheimer’s US policy 
analyses (Rathbun, 2008: 320–321), rather than incorporating systematic account of such 
non-survival motives into their theoretical frameworks. Of course, this may be justified sac-
rifice of coverage for parsimony; conversely, sacrificing such parsimony for further explana-
tory coverage is also defensible (Glaser, 2003: 408).
38. In practice, the state’s inhabitants may disagree among themselves – but heuristically, some 
compound of their preferences can be taken as the state-level preference.
39. Of course, aid programmes may themselves be thought to enhance giving states’ own safety 
by reducing future instability; whether the respective ‘goods’ for the giver are esteem-based 
or security-based – and the costs or benefits of aid spending versus military spending for each 
– can therefore vary by case.
40. Such role conceptions may be contested internally (Jones, 2017), but expansionist concep-
tions of ‘great-power’ performance are manifestly influential.
41. Russia and India are also important cases, but further from this particular ideal-type. Russia 
is clearly not China or the United States’ equal in economic or technological potential, and 
shares Anglo-French status anxiety. But its vast nuclear arsenal, large conventional forces, 
and commitment to strategic independence set it apart from richer and more advanced – yet 
smaller and alliance-constrained – France or Britain. India, meanwhile, still lacks capabili-
ties that France, Britain, and Russia all possess. But conversely, given its population size 
and developmental trajectory, it has better prospects than any of those three for becoming 
a true ‘pole’ capable of independently balancing US/Chinese power. The fact that impor-
tant countries do not fit neatly into the three ideal-typical ‘categories’ framed here does not 
undermine the exercise’s utility, for its purpose is not to construct some perfect taxonomy of 
state-types. Its value, rather, lies in highlighting how roleplay and realpolitik pull against each 
other within different sorts of strategic posture.
42. For valuable discussion of continuity and change in French strategic priorities and capabilities, 
see Pannier (2017) and Pannier and Schmitt (2019).
43. Naturally, France can never be so maritime in strategic orientation as Britain, since it shares a 
landmass with other major powers – but correspondingly, there is even less rationale for a sin-
gle carrier, given opportunity-costs vis-à-vis permanently available alternative capabilities.
44. Albeit with some stark Anglo-French differences (for example, over whether the European 
Union (EU) is an obstacle to – or vehicle for – sovereign influence).
45. Other states may fit the ideal-type too, although Germany and Japan are particular exemplars.
46. On the interaction of relative power, institutional leverage, and normative mobilization in 
achieving such persuasion, see Keohane (2013).
47. During the Cold War, both Japan and West Germany were occupied, quasi-sovereign vassals 
of their conquerors. Yet even then, the security imperative towards (for example) nuclear 
deterrence was strong, requiring a concerted package of US carrots (extended-deterrent guar-
antees) and sticks (alliance-abandonment threats) to dissuade proliferation (Gerzhoy, 2017). 
Since 1990, contrastingly, their principal ally has enjoyed an era of unipolar primacy – but 
as US rivals rise, Washington’s ability to shoulder its many allies’ defence burdens simul-
taneously may wane (Blagden, 2015). Accordingly, pressure for military ‘normalization’ in 
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Germany and Japan – especially now they are no longer so controlled by occupying conquer-
ors – has resurged to weigh against ‘civilian’ role conceptions, a continuing preference for 
multilateralism and alliance-subordination notwithstanding (e.g. Crawford and Olsen, 2017; 
Hughes, 2006).
48. This is not to accuse Russia of malign motives (although neither are they precluded); rather, 
Moscow has understandable strategic reasons to wish to balance, weaken, and ideally break 
an expansionist alliance created for its containment (Shifrinson, 2016). Nonetheless, from 
NATO’s perspective, the effective consequence is Russian hostility.
49. Various prime ministers have visited the controversial Yasukuni shrine, for example, which 
commemorates Japan’s war dead (including convicted war criminals) – although they 
have articulated anti-war rationales for doing so (BBC 2013) – while certain public-school 
textbooks are accused of propagating nationalist views of pre-1945 history that downplay 
Japanese atrocities (Ryall, 2017).
50. Its Izumo-/Hyūga-/Ōsumi-class warships are de-facto aircraft carriers and amphibious-
assault platforms, respectively – although given Japan’s archipelagic territorial composition 
(unlike Germany), the ability to protect or reinforce threatened territories by sea is an obvious 
imperative.
51. This prohibition has subsequently been reinterpreted as permitting assistance to allies’ 
defence, but remains in place as a general constraint on offensive operations as foreign-policy 
instruments (Sieg, 2019).
52. Even defensive strategy can require offensive tactics, operations, and capabilities (and vice 
versa; Lieber, 2005).
53. Accordingly, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been pushing for another constitutional ‘rein-
terpretation’ to permit such weapon-types prior to relinquishing office – but whether his 
successor(s) will sustain such efforts in the face of domestic opposition generated by such 
‘civilian-power’ role conceptions remains to be seen (Kelly and Takenaka, 2020; Sieg, 2019).
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